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Abstract
We investigate the conditions under which an inequality averse and additively sepa-
rable welfarist constitution maker would always choose to set up a progressive equaliza-
tion payments scheme in a federation with local public goods. A progressive equaliza-
tion payments scheme is deﬁned as a list of per capita net (possibly negative) subsidies
— one such net subsidy for every jurisdiction — that are decreasing with respect to
jurisdictions per capita wealth. We examine these questions in a setting in which the
case for progressivity is a priori the strongest, namely, all citizens have the same utility
function for the private and the public goods, inhabitants of a given jurisdiction are all
identical, and they are not able to move across jurisdictions. We show that the consti-
tution maker favors a progressive equalization payments scheme for all distributions of
wealth and all population sizes if and only if its objective function is additively sepa-
rable between each jurisdiction’s per capita wealth and number of inhabitants. When
interpreted as a mean of order r social welfare function, this condition is shown to
be equivalent to additive separability of the individual’s indirect utility function with
respect to wealth and the price of the public good. Some implications of this restriction
to the case where the individual’s direct utility function is additively separable are also
derived.
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1 Introduction
Many federal countries have developed equalization payments schemes by which a central
government transfers money between jurisdictions. For instance these equalization payments
are entrenched in the Canadian constitution. They also underlie the design of the European
Funds for Structural Development which are given to speciﬁc regions suﬀering from economic
backwardness. The alleged purpose of these schemes is, as their name suggests, to equal-
ize citizens’ access to public services across jurisdictions. It is usually thought that these
transfers should somehow correct for the unequal distribution of wealth across jurisdictions.
More speciﬁcally, most equalization payments schemes that we are aware of are explicitly
progressive: they are designed in such a way that the (net) per capita subsidy received by a
jurisdiction is decreasing with respect to its per capita wealth.
There are, of course, many reasons to question the soundness of this progressivity from
a normative viewpoint. One such reason is cross-jurisdiction taste diﬀerences. Why should
the inhabitants of a jurisdiction who like the public good and who decide to contribute
extensively to its ﬁnancing be required to transfer money to people living in a slightly poorer
jurisdiction who care very little about the public good and have all their money available for
private consumption?
Another obvious source of skepticism with respect to progressive equalization systems
is within-jurisdiction heterogeneity. Suppose jurisdiction A has a slightly higher per capita
wealth than jurisdiction B but that the distribution of wealth within A is much more unequal
than B. Suppose in particular that a signiﬁcant fraction of A’s population is extremely poor
while nobody experiments severe poverty in B. There is then no reason to expect a transfer
of money from A to B. As a matter of fact, standard inequality aversion considerations, such
as those underlying the ranking of Lorenz curves, could very well recommend a transfer from
B to A in a case like this.
A third easy case that can be made against progressivity arises if mobility across jurisdic-
tions is high. If citizens can easily move from one jurisdiction to the next, then progressive
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equalization payments may not be sustainable because it may induce citizens from dona-
tor jurisdictions who make transfer payments (and who therefore receive less public good
than the tax they pay) to move to recipient ones. In order to prevent such migration, the
constitution maker may have to limit the progressivity of its scheme.1
But suppose we abstract from these three reasons that mitigate the appeal of progressivity
of equalization payments schemes in federations. Wouldn’t progressivity become defensible
then? The aim of this note is to provide a negative answer to this question. More speciﬁcally,
we consider an arbitrary federation populated by a given number of individuals who have
the same utility function for one private good and one local public good. These individuals
are partitioned into a given number of jurisdictions according to their wealth. All individ-
uals within a jurisdiction have the same wealth, and individuals are not allowed to move
across jurisdictions. In this stylized world, we examine the type of equalization payments
systems that a “constitution maker” would adopt if its objective was the maximization of a
symmetric, quasi-concave and additively separable function of the citizens’ well-being.2
We show that, even in this a priori favorable case, the conditions for the optimal equal-
ization payments scheme to be progressive for all distributions of wealth and individuals
between jurisdictions are stringent. More speciﬁcally, we show that a necessary and suﬃ-
cient condition that the objective function of the constitution maker must satisfy in order to
always choose a progressive equalization payments scheme is to be additively separable with
respect to a jurisdiction’s per capita wealth and its number of inhabitants, a variable which
corresponds to the (inverse of) the Lindahl price of the public good.
1It is not at all clear that allowing for cross-jurisdiction mobility would reduce the progressivity of the
equalization payment scheme that a welfarist constitution maker would favor. If citizens living in relatively
poor jurisdictions envy the package of public good and taxes of their wealthier neighbors, the constitution
maker may have to increase progressivity in order to prevent the citizens of poorer jurisdictions to move to
richer ones. The (diﬃcult) analysis of the optimal equalization payments scheme when mobility is allowed
across jurisdictions is the object of another paper (see Gravel and Poitevin (2004)).
2See Acze´l and Pﬁngsten (1993) or Buhl and Pﬁngsten (1990) for an alternative normative approach to
equalization payments in federations.
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The stringency of this condition can be appreciated better if the social welfare function
used by the constitution maker to aggregate individuals’ utilities is specialized somewhat. A
specialization which seems natural in the redistributive context considered here is the mean
of order r family of social welfare functions which contains many well-known and widely
used social welfare functions (such as utilitarianism, Rawls, Nash-Bernoulli, etc.) as special
cases. If such a specialization is adopted, we show that the additive separability of the
constitution maker’s objective function implies the additive separability of the individual’s
indirect utility function between wealth and the (Lindahl) price of the public good. This is a
condition that signiﬁcantly restricts the kind of preferences that citizens are allowed to have
over the public and private goods. For instance, if the direct utility function for the private
and public goods is assumed to be additively separable itself, the additive separability of the
citizen’s indirect utility between wealth and the price of public good implies that the direct
utility is logarithmic with respect to the public good.
That these restrictions be necessary and suﬃcient for a progressive equalization pay-
ments system to be deemed optimal from a welfarist point of view even in this stylized world
are clear indications that progressivity is not a natural feature of an optimal equalization
payments scheme. More fundamentally these results show that, when dealing with redistri-
bution in multi-jurisdictions systems with public good provision, individual wealth is not
the only variable of interest. Another one is the number of people living in the jurisdiction
which contributes to reducing the jurisdiction’s per capita cost of providing the public good.
Clearly, jurisdictions with many inhabitants are able to aﬀord a given amount of public good
at a lower per capita tax cost. This advantage of large population jurisdictions over small
population ones must be accounted for by the constitution maker when performing cross-
jurisdictions redistribution. Of course the speciﬁc nature of this account depends crucially
upon the way by which the marginal social value of wealth, which the constitution maker
seeks to equalize across jurisdictions, varies with the tax price of the public good. If the
marginal social value of wealth increases with the tax price of the public good, then the
constitution maker may be willing to transfer wealth from highly populated and relatively
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poor jurisdictions to richer but sparsely populated ones. Conversely, if the marginal social
value of wealth decreases with respect to the tax price, the constitution maker may ﬁnd
appropriate to transfer wealth from lowly populated and poor jurisdictions to richer and
heavily populated ones. In each of these cases, the constitution maker may ﬁnd appropriate
to depart from progressivity. It is only when the marginal social value of wealth is indepen-
dent from the tax price — which arises if the social objective function is additively separable
between the tax price and wealth — that the constitution maker always ﬁnds progressivity
to be optimal.
The next section introduces the model and proves the main result. Section 3 interprets the
result in the speciﬁc case where the constitution maker’s objective is a mean of order r of the
citizens’ utility, and examines the implications of the result for the case where households’
direct utility is assumed to be additively separable. Section 4 concludes.
2 The model and main result
2.1 The model
We consider a country populated by n ∈ N++ households living in k ∈ {1, ..., n} a priori
given jurisdictions. There are nj households who live in jurisdiction j (j = 1, ..., k) so that∑k
j=1 nj = n. A household living in jurisdiction j has a private wealth ωj which it uses to
pay taxes and to make private consumption. Jurisdictions are labeled in such a way that
ω1 ≥ ω2 ≥ ... ≥ ωk. Households derive utility from a single local public good (whose quantity
is denoted by z) and from private consumption (whose quantity is denoted by c). Speciﬁcally,
all households in the country convert alternative bundles of public and private good into
well-being by the same strictly concave, monotonically increasing and twice continuously
diﬀerentiable utility function U : R2+ → R. We shall also sometimes assume, notably in
section 3, that, in addition to the above properties, U is additively separable so that it can
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be written, for every bundle (z, c) ∈ R2+, as
U(z, c) = f(z) + h(c),
for some twice continuously diﬀerentiable functions fand h from R+ to R. We denote by V
the indirect utility function deﬁned, for every (pz, pc, R) ∈ R3++,3 by
V (pz, pc, R) = max
z,c
U(z, c) subject to pzz + pcc ≤ R. (1)
We also denote by zM (pz, pc, R) and c
M (pz, pc, R) the (Marshallian) demands for the public
good and private consumption (respectively) when the prices for these two goods are pz
and pc and when the wealth of the household is R. These Marshallian demands are deﬁned
as usual as the solution of program (1). Given the assumptions imposed on U , we know
that the Marshallian demands and the indirect utility function are diﬀerentiable functions
of prices and wealth. We denote by U the class of all direct utility functions that satisfy all
these properties and by UA, the subset of U consisting of those functions that are additively
separable.
The local public good is purchased at a price p > 0 and its purchase is ﬁnanced by
taxation. Tax rates are allowed to diﬀer across jurisdictions. We consider the case where
households are not allowed to move across jurisdictions.4 Moreover, we allow the federal
government to redistribute purchasing power across jurisdictions in order to harmonize pri-
vate good and public good consumption. In this setting, if Tj = ωj − cj denote the tax paid
by a household living in jurisdiction j, the country’s feasibility constraint writes:
k∑
j=1
pzj ≤
k∑
j=1
njTj. (2)
3We restrict the domain of admissible prices and wealth to R3++.
4The more realistic situation where households are allowed to move across jurisdictions is examined in a
companion paper (see Gravel and Poitevin (2004)).
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2.2 Conditions for a progressive equalization payments scheme
Assume that the constitution maker is welfarist in the sense that it ranks alternative allo-
cations of tax and public good according to the value taken by a monotonically increasing
function of the citizens’ well-being.Welfarism is obviously not the only viewpoint for apprais-
ing normatively equalization payments in a federation (see, for instance, Acze´l and Pﬁngsten
(1993) or Buhl and Pﬁngsten (1990) for alternatives). Yet, it is a widely used ethics in eco-
nomics and can be given convincing justiﬁcations (for example, see Blackorby, Bossert and
Donaldson (2001)). This welfarist assumption amounts to say that the constitution maker
chooses taxes and public good levels that solve the following program.
max
z1 ,T1,...,zk ,Tk
W (U(z1, ω1 − T1), ..., U(zk, ωk − Tk)) (3)
s.t. Tj ≤ ωj , zj ≥ 0 for all j, and
k∑
j=1
pzj ≤
k∑
j=1
njTj,
for some continuous and monotonically increasing Bergson-Samuelson social welfare function
W : Rn → R.
Consider a solution {z∗j , T ∗j }kj=1 to this program (which exists by virtue of Weierstrass
Theorem). It is immediate to see that this solution satisﬁes the budget constraint (2) at
equality. Let s∗j = pz
∗
j /nj −T ∗j denote the (possibly negative) net per capita subsidy received
by a household of jurisdiction j. We characterize under which conditions a welfarist constitu-
tion maker would always ﬁnd optimal to select net per capita subsidies that are progressive
in the precise sense of being decreasing with respect to the per capita jurisdiction’s wealth.
For further reference, we give a formal deﬁnition of this notion of progressivity as follows.
Deﬁnition 1. An equalization payments system s1, ..., sk is progressive if and only if sj ≤
sj+1 for all j = 1, ..., k − 1.
This deﬁnition of progressivity deserves, perhaps, a few comments. The common deﬁni-
tion of progressivity of a tax system is that the ratio of the net taxes paid by a household
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over its income is non-decreasing with respect to income. Using this deﬁnition in our setting
would amount to require that the ratio sj/ωj of the per capita net subsidy over the jurisdic-
tion’s per capita wealth to be decreasing with respect to per capita wealth. The justiﬁcation
usually given to this common deﬁnition of progressivity lies in the fact, apparently ﬁrst es-
tablished by Jakobsson (1976) (see also Eichhorn, Funke and Richter (1984), Moyes (1994)
and Thon (1987)) that it is equivalent to requiring the relative Lorenz curve associated to
the post-tax income distribution to be everywhere above that associated to the before-tax
income distribution. As is well-known, the relative Lorenz curve associated to an income
distribution is the graph of the function that maps every household’s rank in the ordering
of incomes to the fraction of the aggregate wealth held by all households in (weakly) lower
ranks. Albeit there exists good arguments for using the relative Lorenz curve when ap-
praising the impact of alternative policies on income inequalities, the relative conception of
equality which underlies this curve has been the object of some criticism, notably by Kolm
(1976). These criticisms have motivated the deﬁnition of an absolute Lorenz curve, studied
in particular by Moyes (1987). The absolute Lorenz curve is the graph of the function that
maps every household’s rank into the diﬀerence between the aggregate wealth and the total
income held by households. As it turns out, it is the criterion of absolute Lorenz domination
that would justify the notion of progressivity considered in this paper. More speciﬁcally,
as established by Moyes (1988) and Moyes (1994), requiring a tax system to always lead to
a post-tax income distribution whose absolute Lorenz curve lies everywhere above that of
the pre-tax income distribution is equivalent to requiring households’ tax payments to be
non-decreasing with respect to households’ wealth.
While we are doing the analysis with the absolute notion of progressivity, it is an easy
matter (see fact 1 below) to rephrase it in terms of the relative notion.
We start the analysis by establishing a simple (but useful) lemma5 which says that the
social planner’s problem (3) can be thought of as being solved in two steps: a ﬁrst step in
which the constitution maker chooses the per capita net subsidies (s∗1, ..., s
∗
k) that maximize
5The proofs of all lemmas and theorems have been gathered in the Appendix.
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the composition of the social welfare function with the households’ indirect utilities, and
a second step where each jurisdiction j’s household solves a ﬁctitious standard consumer’s
problem of allocating optimally its private wealth and the net per capita subsidy between
private consumption (purchased at a price of 1) and public good spending (purchased at
price p/nj).
Lemma 1. Let U be a utility function in U . Then the vector of local public goods and taxes
{z∗j , T ∗j }kj=1 deﬁned, for every j = 1, ..., k, by z∗j = zMj (p/nj , 1, ωj + s∗j (p, n1, ω1, ..., nk, ωk))
and T ∗j = ωj − cMj (p/nj , 1, ωi + s∗j (p, n1, ω1, ..., nk, ωk) where
{s∗j(·)}kj=1 ∈ arg max
s1,...,sk
W (V (p/n1, 1, ω1 + s1), ..., V (p/nk, 1, ωk + sk))
s.t.
k∑
j=1
njsj ≤ 0 and sj ≥ −ωj for all j, (4)
deﬁne a solution to the original program (3).
This lemma highlights the fact that, in a federation made of diﬀerent homogeneous
jurisdictions, jurisdiction’s per capita wealth is not the only criterion used by the constitution
maker to design equalization payment schemes. The constitution maker must also take into
consideration the number of households living in a jurisdiction. The larger this number
is, the lower is the per capita cost (or price) of providing one unit of public good in a
jurisdiction. When redistributing wealth across jurisdictions, the constitution maker must
take into consideration these cross-jurisdiction diﬀerences in the price of public good.
We want to know the conditions that the constitution maker’s objective need to satisfy
in order for the solution of (4) to be progressive for all distributions {nj , ωj}kj=1 of population
sizes and individual wealths.
To make this question somewhat interesting, it is natural to impose additional restrictions
on the Bergson-Samuelson function used by the constitution maker. For progressivity is
clearly not to be expected a priori from an arbitrary social welfare function which does not
exhibit some inequality aversion. We therefore require W to be quasi-concave and symmetric.
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We also require W to be additively separable with respect to utilities. This latter assumption,
which can be justiﬁed on normative grounds (see for instance Blackorby et al. (2001)), is
made for simplicity. These three assumptions amount to say that W can be deﬁned by
W (u1, ..., un) =
n∑
i=1
g(ui) (5)
for some monotonically increasing and continuous function g : R → R which needs to be
concave if W is to be quasi-concave. A nice example of a Bergson-Samuelson social welfare
function which ﬁts in this setting is the mean-of-order r function where, for any r ∈ −∞, 1],
Wr : R
n
+ → R is deﬁned by6
Wr(u1, ..., un) =
[
n∑
j=1
U rj
] 1
r
if r = 0 and
Wr(u1, ..., un) =
n∑
j=1
lnUj otherwise,
where the functions gr referred to in (5) can be deﬁned by
gr(u) = ur if r ∈ ]0, 1] (6)
g0(u) = lnu and
gr(u) = −ur if r ∈ −∞, 0[.
As is well known (and can be easily seen), the case where r = 1 is that of a utilitarian
constitution maker, while the limiting case of r = −∞ is that which would correspond to
an inﬁnitely inequality averse Rawlsian one. We shall return to this example in the next
section.
6The deﬁnition of this social welfare function requires individual utilities to be measured in positive units.
See Blackorby and Donaldson (1982) for justiﬁcations and properties of this social welfare function.
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For a social welfare function satisfying (5), program (4) becomes
max
s1,...,sk
k∑
j=1
njg(V (p/nj , 1, ωj + sj))
s.t.
k∑
j=1
njsj ≤ 0, and sj ≥ −ωj for all j.
Deﬁning the function Φ : R2++ → R by
Φ(pz, R) = g(V (pz, 1, R)),
we can more compactly write (4) as
max
s1,...,sk
k∑
j=1
njΦ(p/nj , ωj + sj)
s.t.
k∑
j=1
njsj ≤ 0, and sj ≥ −ωj for all j. (7)
This program has a unique solution s∗j (for j = 1, ..., k) (due to the strict concavity of Φ with
respect to its second argument). This solution is, thanks to Berge’s Maximum Theorem, a
continuous function s∗j(p, n1, ..., nk, ω1, ..., ωk) of the 2k + 1 parameters that deﬁne program
(7). It is diﬀerentiable in those parameters if the objective function is twice diﬀerentiable. It
follows in particular that the ﬁrst-order conditions of (7) characterize any interior solution
to this program.
The ﬁrst-order conditions are
∀ h, j ∈ {1, ..., k} : Φj∗R (·) ≡ Φh∗R (·),
k∑
j=1
njs
∗
j (p, n1, ..., nk, ω1, ..., ωk) ≡ 0,
where, for every jurisdiction j,
Φj∗R (·) =
∂Φ(p/nj , ωj + s
∗
j(p, n1, ..., nk, ω1, ..., ωk))
∂R
.
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Diﬀerentiating these conditions with respect to ωh, one obtains:
∂s∗j(·)
∂ωh
≡ Φ
h∗
RR(·)
Φj∗RR(·)
(
1 +
∂s∗h(·)
∂ωh
)
for all h, j ∈ {1, ..., k} (8)
and
k∑
j=1
nj
∂s∗j (·)
∂ωh
≡ 0. (9)
Substituting (8) into (9) and rearranging yields:
∂s∗h(·)
∂ωh
≡ −
∑
i=h ni/Φ
i∗
RR(·)∑k
i=1 ni/Φ
i∗
RR(·)
< 0. (10)
Hence, thanks to the strict concavity of Φ with respect to its second argument, an increase in
the wealth of a household living in jurisdiction h always reduces the optimal subsidy received
by this household.
If one substitutes (10) back into (8) and rearranges the expression, one gets:
∂s∗j(·)
∂ωh
≡ nh
Φj∗RR(·)
(∑k
i=1 ni/Φ
i∗
RR(·)
) > 0. (11)
Here again, not surprisingly, the subsidy received by a household living in jurisdiction j is
an increasing function of the wealth of any household living in another jurisdiction.
More interesting, and relevant for Theorem 1 below, is the analogous comparative statics
results that concern the relationship between a jurisdiction’s optimal per capita net subsidy
and its population size. One obtains in eﬀect:
∂s∗h(·)
∂nh
≡
pΦh∗pzR(·)/n2h
[∑
i=h ni/Φ
i∗
RR(·)
]
− s∗h(·)
Φh∗RR(·)
[∑k
i=1 ni/Φ
i∗
RR(·)
] (12)
and
∂s∗j(·)
∂nh
= − pΦ
h∗
pzR
(·)/Φh∗RR(·) + s∗h(·)
Φj∗RR(·)
[∑k
i=1 ni/Φ
i∗
RR(·)
]. (13)
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The sign of each of these two expressions, given by the sign of the numerator, cannot be
determined in general. This sign depends crucially upon that of Φh∗pzR which measures how
the social marginal utility of wealth varies with the price of the public good. To understand
how optimal subsidy received by jurisdiction h depends upon its population size, consider
the situation where the constitution maker ﬁnds optimal to give to h a zero subsidy. Then,
an exogenous increase in the number of households living in h will reduce the optimal subsidy
received by h if and only if ΦhpzR is positive. As it turns out, this simple fact is the basic
ingredient of the proof of Theorem 1 below, which establishes that ΦpzR = 0 is a necessary
and suﬃcient condition that Φ must satisfy in order for progressive net subsidies to be the
solution of (7) for all distributions of wealth and population across jurisdictions.
Theorem 1. Let U be a utility function in U . Then the solution {s∗j (·)}kj=1 of (7) is progres-
sive for all distributions of wealth and population across jurisdictions if and only if ΦpzR = 0.
The intuition for this result goes as follows. The condition is suﬃcient because any redis-
tribution of income across households of diﬀerent jurisdictions does not aﬀect the marginal
(dis)utility for the public good price. If progressivity is not satisﬁed for two jurisdictions (that
is, if a richer jurisdiction receives a larger per capita subsidy than a poorer one), it is possible
to redistribute from the richer to the poorer jurisdiction without aﬀecting the allocation of
the public good. By concavity of social preferences, this redistribution is desirable.
The condition is also necessary. Suppose it was not satisﬁed for some (pz, R). Consider
the federation where all jurisdictions have the same wealth and population at R and n = p/pz
respectively (for some suitable choice of p). At this allocation, all subsidies are zero. It is
always possible to ﬁnd a direction of change for a new federation, direction which depends
on the sign of ΦpzR, such that subsidies would not be progressive.
As mentioned above, the result of Theorem 1 which characterizes the condition under
which a welfarist constitution maker always favors progressivity in the absolute sense can
be rephrased in terms of the more conventional notion of relative progressivity. The key
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ingredient in this rephrasing is the deﬁnition of the function, for j = 1, ..., k:
δ∗j : R++ × (N++ × R++) → [−1,∞
by
δ∗j (p, n1, ω1, ..., nk, ωk) =
s∗j (p, n1, ω1, ..., nk, ωk)
ωj
for any (p, n1, ω1, ..., nk, ωk) ∈ R++ × (N++ × R++)k. For each jurisdiction j, the absolute
value of δ∗j gives the fraction of jurisdiction j’s per capita wealth which is received in subsidy
(if δ∗j is positive) or paid in tax (if δ
∗
j is negative) that is deemed appropriate by the social
planner. It is clear that (δ∗1(·), ..., δ∗k(·)) is the unique solution of
max
δ1,...,δk
W (V (p/n1, 1, ω1(1 + δ1), ..., V (p/nk, 1, ωk(1 + δk))
s.t.
k∑
j=1
njωjδj ≤ 0, and δj ≥ −1 for all j. (14)
The progressivity in the relative sense of the equalization payments system is the requirement
that δ∗j (·) ≤ δ∗j+1(·) for j = 1, ..., k − 1. We leave to the reader the task of verifying the
following fact.
Fact 1. Let U be a utility function in U . Then the solution (s∗1(·), ..., s∗k(·)) of (7) satisﬁes
progressivity in the absolute sense if and only if the solution (δ∗1(·), ..., δ∗k(·)) of (14) satisﬁes
progressivity in the relative sense.
3 Interpretation for a mean-of-order r constitution maker
We provide in this section some implications for the households’ utility function, of the
requirement of additive separability of Φ characterized in Theorem 1. The next theorem
provides these restrictions for the case where the constitution maker aggregates households’
utilities by a mean-of-order r social welfare function deﬁned above.
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Theorem 2. Let U be utility function in U and let the social welfare function W be mean-
of-order r as deﬁned above where r ∈ −∞, 1]. Then, ΦpzR(pz, R) = 0 for every (pz, R) ∈ R2+
if and only if each household’s indirect utility function can be written as
V (pz, pc, R) = [Υ
r
1(pz , pc) + Υ
r
2(pc, R)]
1
r for r ∈ −∞, 1]\{0},
and
V (pz, pc, R) = [Υ
0
1(pz , pc)Υ
0
2(pc, R)] for r = 0.
This theorem illustrates the strength of the condition of additive separability of the
social objective in terms of its implication on households’ preferences for the public and
the private goods. As Theorem 2 makes clear, these indirect preferences must be additively
separable with respect to the price of the public good and the household wealth. Furthermore,
Theorem 2 indicates that the numerical representation of these indirect preferences that
the constitution maker must use in order to achieve its objective must be the additive
representation of these preferences raised at the power 1/r. That this additive separability
of the household’s indirect preference is a signiﬁcant restriction is now further emphasized by
considering that the household’s direct utility function used to deﬁne the additively separable
indirect utility function is itself additively separable.
Theorem 3. Let U be a direct utility function in UA. Then,
V (pz, pc, R) = Υ
0(pz, pc) + Υ
1(pc, R)
for some functions Υ0 : R2++ → R and Υ1 : R2++ → R continuous and homogeneous of degree
0 if and only if U can be written as
U(z, c) = b ln z + h(c)
for all (z, c) ∈ R2+ and some strictly positive real number b.
Hence, within the class of additively separable utility functions, only those that are
logarithmic with respect to public good consumption can give rise to indirect utility functions
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for which the marginal utility of wealth is independent from the (Lindahl) price of public
good. In conjunction with Theorems 1 and 2, this implies that if a welfarist social planner
uses primal utility functions that are additively separable, it is only when these utilities
are logarithmic in the public good that the planner always considers optimal to set up a
progressive equalization payments scheme.
In the proof of Theorem 3, some use has been made of the property of strict concavity of
the utility function (in particular the property that ∂2h(c)/∂2c < 0). This property rules out
the possibility for the utility function to be quasi-linear (linear in the private good, concave
in the public good), a property commonly assumed in public good provision problems. If
one is willing to weaken the requirement of strict concavity of the utility function to that
of concavity (which allows for quasi-linearity), then one can obtain the following minor
amendment to Theorem 3.
Theorem 4. Let U be an additively separable, derivable, monotonically increasing, and
concave direct utility function. Then,
V (pz, pc, R) = Υ
0(pz, pc) + Υ
1(pc, R)
for some functions Υ0 : R2++ → R and Υ1 : R2++ → R continuous and homogeneous of degree
0 if and only if either U can be written as
U(z, x) = b ln z + h(c)
for all (z, c) ∈ R2+ and some strictly positive real number b, or U is linear with respect to the
private good, that is, U can be written as
U(z, x) = f(z) + ac
for all (z, c) ∈ R2+ and some strictly positive real number a.
4 Conclusion
This paper provides a necessary and suﬃcient condition that an individual indirect utility
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function must satisfy in order for the choice of an equalization payments system made by a
welfarist constitution maker who uses an additively separable social welfare function to be
progressive. The condition requires the indirect utility function to be additively separable
with respect to the (Lindahl) price of public good and wealth. The condition is rather strong
since it implies, for instance, that if the direct utility function is additively separable, it must
be either logarithmic with respect to the public good or linear with respect to the private
good.
These results are derived in a world where citizens are not allowed to move from one
jurisdiction to another. A natural extension of the research, pursued in the companion paper
Gravel and Poitevin (2004), would be the analysis of the structure of per capita subsidies that
would be chosen by a welfarist constitution maker who would allow households to change
jurisdiction in order to get their most preferred allocation of public good and taxes.
From the perspective of Lemma 1, it is not surprising to ﬁnd that progressivity is not
a genuine property that an ideal welfarist constitution maker would like to impose on an
equalization payments scheme in a federation. After all, the notion of progressivity of a tax
system (or an equalization payments scheme) considered in this paper, and for that matter in
most of the literature we are aware of, is justiﬁed by the equalizing impact that this system
is supposed to have on the distribution of income. A progressive tax system (or equalization
payments scheme) is simply a system which guarantees that the after-tax income distribution
is unambiguously more equal than the before-tax one. Yet the standard deﬁnition of what it
means for an income distribution to be unambiguously more equal than another is based on
the Lorenz domination criterion (in its absolute or relative version). While there are sound
and well-known arguments (see, for instance, Atkinson (1970) or Sen (1973)) in favor of using
Lorenz domination criteria in a world where households are identical in every respect other
than income, these arguments collapse in the world considered herein where households
living in diﬀerent jurisdictions diﬀer both in private and public consumption. Why after
all should we favor transferring wealth from a province with a high per capita GDP and
with a small population to a poorer but more populous one? Since the latter has a cost
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advantage in producing the public good, it is not clear that it should receive subsidy from
the former. What is needed in order to appraise progressivity in the current context is a
theory of multidimensional inequality measurement, one which would deal with inequality
that arises both from the distribution of the private good and the public good. And it is
fair to say that, despite some interesting attempts, the most relevant to the current context
being Atkinson and Bourguignon (1982), multidimensional inequality measurement has not
reached the state of development of its unidimensional counterpart. Developing methods for
normatively appraising the multidimensional inequalities that arise both from public good
and private good consumption should clearly be a high priority for future research.
If the mere conclusion that an optimal equalization payments scheme need not be pro-
gressive in the usual (unidimensional) sense of the word is not, in itself surprising, it remains
that many actual federal systems are designed with this standard notion of progressivity.
The main contribution of this paper should thus be seen as the identiﬁcation of the ex-
act set of conditions that citizens’ preferences must satisfy in order for progressivity to be
rationalizable from a welfarist perspective.
References
Acze´l, M. and A. Pﬁngsten, “Constituent Sensitive Public Fund Sharing,” in W.E.
Diewert, K Spreman, and K. Sterling, eds., Mathematical Modelling in Economics,
Springer Verlag, 1993, pp. 2–10.
Atkinson, A. B. and F. Bourguignon, “The Comparison of Multi-Dimensioned Distri-
bution of Economic Status,” Review of Economic Studies, 1982, 49, 183–201.
Atkinson, A.B., “On the Measurement of Inequality,” Journal of Economic Theory, 1970,
2, 244–263.
Blackorby, C. and D. Donaldson, “Ratio-Scale and Translation-Scale Full Interpersonnal
Comparability Without Domain Restrictions: Admissible Social Evaluation Func-
18
tions,” International Economic Review, 1982, 23, 249–268.
, W. Bossert, and D. Donaldson, “Utilitarianism and the Theory of Justice,” in
K. Arrow, A. Sen, and K. Suzumura, eds., Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare,
Elsevier, 2001.
Buhl, H. U. and A. Pﬁngsten, “On the Distribution of Public Funds,” European Journal
of Political Economy, 1990, 6, 363–376.
Eichhorn, W., H. Funke, and W. F. Richter, “Tax Progression and Inequality of
Income Distribution,” Journal of Mathematical Economics, 1984, 13, 127–131.
Gravel, N. and M. Poitevin, “What Is the Best Jurisdiction Structure?,” 2004.
Mimeo, IDEP.
Jakobsson, U., “On the Measurement of the Degree of Progression,” Journal of Public
Economics, 1976, 8, 161–168.
Kolm, S. C., “Unequal Inequalities I,” Journal of Economic Theory, 1976, 12, 416–442.
Moyes, P., “A New Concept of Lorenz Domination,” Economics Letter, 1987, 23, 203–207.
, “A Note on Minimally Progressive Taxation and Absolute Income Inequality,”
Social Choice and Welfare, 1988, 5, 227–234.
, “Inequality Reducing and Inequality Preserving Transformations of Income: Sym-
metric and Individualistic Transformations,” Journal of Economic Theory, 1994, 63,
271–298.
Sen, A. K., On Economic Inequality, Oxford, Clarendon, 1973.
Thon, D., “Redistributive Properties of Progressive Taxation,” Mathematical Social Sci-
ence, 1987, 14, 185–191.
19
APPENDIX
Proof of Lemma 1
Assume by contradiction that
{zMj (p/nj , 1, ωj + s∗j (·)), ωj − cMj (p/nj , 1, ωi + s∗j (·))}kj=1
does not solve (3), that is, assume that there exists (ẑ1, T̂1, ..., ẑk, T̂k) satisfying
∑k
j=1 pẑj ≤
∑k
j=1 njT̂j ,
T̂j ≤ ωj and ẑj ≥ 0 for all j such that
W (U(ẑ1, ω1− T̂1), ..., U(ẑk, ωk− T̂k)) > W (V (p/n1, 1, ω1+s∗1(·)), ..., V (p/nk, 1, ωk+s∗k(·))). (15)
Without loss of generality, since program (3) has a solution in which constraint (2) binds, one can
assume that
∑k
j=1 pẑj =
∑k
j=1 nj T̂j. Deﬁne, for every j, ŝj = pẑj/nj − T̂j and ĉj = ωj− T̂j . Clearly,
pẑj/nj + ĉj ≤ ωj + ŝj . By deﬁnition of the indirect utility function, one has, for every j
V (p/nj , 1, ωj + ŝj) ≥ U(ẑj , ωj − T̂j),
and, since W is monotonically increasing,
W (V (p/n1, 1, ω1 + ŝ1), ..., V (p/nk, 1, ωk + ŝk)) ≥ W (U(ẑ1, ω1 − T̂1), ..., U(ẑk, ωk − T̂k)).
Since ŝj ≥ −ωj for all j and
∑k
j=1 ŝj = 0, this inequality, together with (15), contradicts the
deﬁnition of {s∗j}kj=1 as the solution to program (4).
Proof of Theorem 1
• Suﬃciency. Assume ΦpzR = 0. Then, one can write Φ(pz, R) = Υ(pz) + Ψ(R) for some func-
tions Υ : N++ → R monotonically decreasing and quasi-convex, and Ψ : R+ → R monotoni-
cally increasing and strictly concave (since V is concave with respect to wealth and g is concave).
By contradiction, consider any (p, n1, ω1, ..., nk, ωk) ∈ R++ × (N++ × R++)k and assume that
the solution (s∗1(·), ..., s∗k(·)) of (7) involves s∗j (p, n1, ..., nk, ω1, ..., ωk) > s∗j+1(n1, ..., nk, ω1, ..., ωk)
for some j ∈ {1, ..., , k − 1}. Consider reducing the net per capita subsidy of jurisdiction j by
δ ≡ (ωj−ωj+1 +s∗j (·)−s∗j+1(·))/2 > 0 and increasing that of jurisdiction j+1 by the same amount.
This change in per capita net subsidies obviously respects the constraints of program (7). Notice
in particular that
ωj + s∗j (·) > ωj + s∗j (·)− δ = ωj+1 + s∗j+1(·) + δ > ωj+1 + s∗j+1(·).
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Now:
∑
h =j,j+1
nhΦ(p/nh, ωh + s∗h(·)) + njΦ(p/nj , ωj + s∗j (·)− δ) +
nj+1Φ(p/nj+1, ωj + s∗j (·)− δ)−
k∑
h=1
nhΦ(p/nh, ωh + s∗h(·))
= njΦ(p/nj , ωj + s∗j (·)− δ) + nj+1Φ(p/nj+1, ωj + s∗j (·)− δ)
−njΦ(p/nj, ωj + s∗j (·))− nj+1Φ(p/nj+1, ωj+1 + s∗j+1(·))
= njΨ(ωj + s∗j (·)− δ) + nj+1Ψ(ωj + s∗j (·)− δ)− njΨ(ωj + s∗j (·))− nj+1Ψ(ωj+1 + s∗j+1(·))
> 0
by the concavity of Ψ. This gives us the required contradiction that (s∗1(·), ..., s∗k(·)) is a solution of
program (7).
• Necessity. Assume that ΦpzR(pz, R) = 0 for some (pz, R) ∈ R2++. Consider the federation where,
for some strictly positive real number p and strictly positive integer n˜ satisfying pz = p/n˜, one
has (p, n1, ω1, ..., nk, ωk) = (p, n˜, R, n˜, R, ...., n˜, R). The optimal subsidies that solve (7) for this
federation are s∗j (p, n˜, R, n˜, R, ...., n˜, R) = 0 for all j. Assume ﬁrst that ΦpzR(1/n˜, R) > 0, and
consider increasing by a suitably small and strictly positive ε the number of inhabitants in some
jurisdiction h. Using (13), we know that the subsidies received in jurisdictions j = h increase and
become positive while the subsidies received in h become negative. Using (12) and (13), we have
that
s∗h(p, n˜, R, ..., n˜, R, n˜+ ε, R, n˜, R, ...., n˜, R) < 0 < s
∗
j (n˜, R, ..., n˜, R, n˜+ ε
∗, R, n˜, R, ...., n˜, R)
for all j = h. A small enough increase of individual j’s wealth would give us, in view of (10) and
the continuity of the optimal response functions s∗j , the required violation of progressivity. The
argument for the case where ΦpzR(1/n˜, R) < 0 is similar.
Proof of Theorem 2
Assume ﬁrst that r ∈ −∞, 1]\{0}. Using the deﬁnition of the mean-of-order r function provided by
(6), we have
ΦpzR(pz , R) = 0 ⇔
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(r− 1)V (pz, 1, R)r−2∂V (pz , 1, R)
∂pz
∂V (pz, 1, R)
∂R
+ V (pz, 1, R)r−1
∂2V (pz, 1, R)
∂pz∂R
= 0.
For r = 1 (utilitarianism), this equality amounts to ∂2V (pz , 1, R)/∂pz∂R = 0 which is equivalent
to the additive separability of the indirect utility function with respect to pz and R. If r < 1 (but
r = 0), this equality can be written as
(1− r)∂V (pz , 1, R)/∂pz
V (pz , 1, R)
=
∂2V (pz , 1, R)/∂pz∂R
∂V (pz , 1, R)/∂R
or
∂(lnV (pz , 1, R)1−r)
∂pz
=
∂(ln∂V (pz, 1, R)/∂R)
∂pz
. (16)
This is a ﬁrst-order partial diﬀerential equation assumed to hold for every (pz , R) ∈ R2+. Deﬁne
V̂ : R2+ → R+ by V̂ (pz, R) = V (pz , 1, R). It can be checked easily that a solution to the partial
diﬀerential equation (16) is given by
V̂ (pz , R) =
(
Υ̂r1(pz) + Υ̂
r
2(R)
) 1
r
for some functions Υ̂r1 : R+ → R+ and Υ̂r2 : R+ → R+ (both depending upon r). By usual regularity
arguments for partial diﬀerential equations, this solution is unique (up to irrelevant constant terms).
For the case where r = 0, using (6), we have that
ΦpzR(pz , R) = 0 ⇔
∂2
(
ln V̂ (pz, R)
)
∂pz∂R
= 0
⇔ ∂V̂ (pz, R)/∂pz
V̂ (pz , R)
=
∂2V̂ (pz, R)/∂pz∂R
∂V̂ (pz, R)/∂R
⇔
∂
(
ln V̂ (pz, R)
)
∂pz
=
∂
(
ln ∂V̂ (pz , R)/∂R
)
∂pz
,
a partial diﬀerential equation, a (unique by standard arguments) solution of which is
V̂ (pz , R) = Υ01(pz)Υ
0
2(R)
for some functions Υ̂01 : R+ → R+ and Υ̂02 : R+ → R+. We note ﬁnally that, since V is homogeneous
of degree 0, we have V̂ (pz, R) = V (p̂z, p̂c, R̂) for every (p̂z , p̂c, R̂) ∈ R3++ such that pz = p̂z/p̂c and
R = R̂/p̂c. Hence, the indirect utility function must have the form (for every (pz, pc, R) ∈ R3++)
V (pz , pc, R) = [Υr1(pz , pc) + Υ
r
2(pc, R)]
1
r for r ∈ −∞, 1]\{0}
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and
V (pz , pc, R) = Υ01(pz, pc)Υ
0
2(pc, R) for r = 0,
where, for all r ∈ −∞, 1], Υr1 : R2++ → R+ is a twice continuously diﬀerentiable function that is
homogeneous of degree 0 and monotonically decreasing (resp. increasing) with respect to each of
its two arguments if r ≥ 0 (resp. < 0), and Υr2 : R2++ → R+ is a twice continuously diﬀerentiable
function that is homogeneous of degree 0, monotonically decreasing (resp. increasing) in its ﬁrst
argument and monotonically increasing (resp. decreasing) in its second argument if r ≥ 0 (resp. <
0).
Proof of Theorem 3
The suﬃciency part being straightforward, we only provide the proof of necessity. We ﬁrst notice
that, under additive separability of U ,
∂2V (pz , pc, R)
∂pz∂R
= 0 for every (pz , pc, R) ∈ R3++ ⇔
∂cM(pz , pc, R)
∂pz
= 0.
To see this, note that, by deﬁnition of the indirect utility function, and under additive separability
of U :
∂V (pz , pc, R)
∂R
=
∂f(zM(pz , pc, R))
∂z
∂zM (pz , pc, R)
∂R
+
∂h(R/pc − pz/pczM (pz , pc, R))
∂c
(
1− pz∂zM (pz , pc, R)/∂R
pc
)
=
∂h(cM(pz , pc, R))
∂c
(
1
pc
)
for every (pz , pc, R) ∈ R3++, thanks to the ﬁrst-order conditions of the consumer’s problem satisﬁed
by Marshallian demands. Hence, as pc is strictly positive, the condition ∂2V (pz , pc, R)/∂pz∂R = 0
is equivalent to the condition
∂2h(cM(pz , pc, R))
∂2c
∂cM(pz , pc, R)
∂pz
= 0.
Since ∂2h(cM(pz , pc, R))/∂
2c < 0, thanks to the strict concavity assumption, this is in turn equiv-
alent to the condition that ∂cM(pz , pc, R)/∂pz = 0 everywhere. Now the Marshallian demand
function cM is locally characterized by the ﬁrst-order condition of the standard consumer problem:
−∂f(R/pz − (pc/pz)c
M(·))
∂z
pc
pz
+
∂h(cM(·))
∂c
≡ 0.
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Diﬀerentiating this (local) identity with respect to pz and rearranging terms yield
∂cM(pz, pc, R.)
∂pz
≡ −(pc/p
2
z)(z
M(·)∂2f(·)/∂2z + ∂f(·)/∂z)
(pc/pz)2 ∂2f(·)/∂2z + ∂2h(·)/∂2c . (17)
Requiring ∂cM(pz , pc, R.)/∂pz = 0 for every (pz, pc, R) ∈ R3++ amounts (since the denominator of
(17) is strictly negative because of the strict concavity of U) to requiring
z
∂2f(z)
∂2z
+
∂f(z)
∂z
= 0 (18)
to hold for every z ∈ R++. The partial diﬀerential equation (18) can also be written as
∂2f(z)/∂2z
∂f(z)/∂z
= −1
z
or
∂(ln∂f(z)/∂z)
∂z
= −1
z
⇔ α + ln ∂f(z)
∂z
= − ln z + β
for some real numbers α and β. Taking the exponential on both sides and rearranging terms yield
∂f(z)
∂z
=
eβ
eαz
or
f(z) =
eβ
eα
ln z.
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